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Erck: Corporate Liquidation Incident to the Acquisition of Assets: A Lo

NOTES
CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS INCIDENT TO THE ACQUISITION
OF ASSETS: A LOOK AT SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS ARISING
FROM A SECTION 332-334(b)(2) LIQUIDATION*
The years since World War II have witnessed an era of unprecedented
growth in the American economy.' As beneficiaries of four decades of prosperity, Americans today produce, grow, use, buy, and sell more goods and
2
services than any other country in the world.
At the heart of this postwar prosperity lies a rapidly expanding financial
and industrial complex. Over the years, businessmen have frequently found
that the best way to increase profits in the face of rising costs has been to
expand production capacity, thereby achieving economies of scale and often
competitive advantage. Sometimes new plant facilities are constructed and
old ones are remodeled and enlarged. In other cases, however, mergers and
acquisitions of existing corporations 3 have proved to be the most advantageous
method of implementing a program of growth. 4 This has been particularly
true in recent times. During the years 1965-1969, for example, corporate
acquisitions in the United States increased to their highest level in fifty
years.5 If only the larger mining and manufacturing firms are considered,
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the summer 1974 quarter.
1. The Gross National Product (GNP) totaled nearly $212 billion at the end of 1945.
During the next thirty years this figure increased 600% to reach the mind-staggering sum
of $1.271 trillion by the end of 1973. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, ATLAS AND YEARBOOK
83 (D. Golenpaul ed., 28th ed. 1974).

2. Id.
3. The term "merger" is often used loosely to describe any type of business combination.
Technically, a "merger is limited to a statutory procedure whereby one of the constituent
companies takes title to the assets of the other one, which in turn loses its existence by
operation of law." W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1622 (4th ed. unabr.
1969). An "acquisition" is a somewhat broader term, describing a transaction whereby
assets are obtained by issuing stock as well as by expending cash. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED

PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS,

OPINIONS

OF

THE

ACCOUNTING

PRINCIPLES

BOARD

No. 16.

Business Combinations 284 n.2 (1970).
4.

By acquiring an existing entity, corporations can eliminate much of the risk and

expense associated with organizing a new business, thereby achieving instant diversification,
economies of scale, and stability of operations without further competitive struggle. W. CARY,
supra note 3, at 1623-24.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 484 (93d ed.
1972). The breakdown is as follows:
PERIOD

TOTAL

1920-1924
1925-1929
1930-1934

.........................................................-.... . 2,235

-

------.-...........---------.................
-------------- . 4,583
................................
...............................
1,687

1935-1939 --.------------------------------------.-.----....----------577

[390]
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corporate mergers and acquisitions during that time totaled 8,213, nearly
double the 4,366 reported for the previous five-year period and more than
fourteen times the figure reported during 1935-1939. 6 Business combinations
in 1970 and 1971 exceeded the 1,000 mark in both years, with over forty
per cent of the acquiring entities having assets in .excess of $50 million.7
While the antitrust laws8 and economic factors weigh heavily in the decision whether to acquire additional facilities, the impact of the Internal
Revenue Code invariably determines how it should be done. "There are in
fact few areas in which tax considerations more completely dominate business
decisions and in which the tax penalties for ill-advised action ... [are] ...
more pronounced." This note examines one of these tax-dominated areas,
basis determination of property received in the liquidation 9 of a purchased
eighty per cent subsidiary within the framework of sections 33211 and
334(b)(2) 12 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. To this end, these statutory
provisions and applicable administrative rulings will be analyzed with the
hope of offering some insight into several current problems that have arisen
in this area.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since 1921, Congress has approved incorporation without the recognition
of gain or loss"3 because of the belief that it was economically unsound to
hinder business from going "forward with the readjustments required by
existing conditions . ... ,"14 This type of legislation, however, encouraged the
proliferation of complex corporate pyramids, prompting the lawmakers in

1940-1944

906

1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969

1,505
1,424
3,365
4,366
8,213

1970
1971

1,351
1,011

6. Id.
7. Id.

8. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970); Clayton Antitrust Act §7, 15
U.S.C. §18 (1970).

9. NV. CARY, supra note 3, at 1630.
10. The process of liquidation involves the winding up of the corporation's affairs,
which consists of collecting its assets, paying all claims and expenses, and distributing the
remaining assets among the shareholders according to their liquidation preferences and
rights. H. HENN, LAW OF CowORAnONs 814 (2d ed. 1970).
11. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §332.

12. Id. §334(b)(2).
13. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230 (now INT. REv.

CODE OF

1954,

§351).
14. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (1921), reprinted in, 1939-1 (pt. 2) Cum. BULL.
181, 189.
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1935 to again hold out the tax-free carrot as an incentive for parent corpora5
tions to swallow-up their progeny and simplify their financial structures.Today, section 332 governs this latter situation. It generally provides that
no gain or loss shall be recognized by a parent corporation on the receipt
of property distributed in complete liquidation of a controlled subsidiary.
Coupled with this nonrecognition treatment are the basis provisions found in
section 334(b). The general rule, contained in section 334(b)(1), provides that
-the basis of property in the hands of a subsidiary shall carry over to the parent
corporation upon a liquidation pursuant to section 332. An exception to this
general rule appears in section 334(b)(2), which allows the asset basis to be
stepped-up 6 to reflect the parent's purchase price of the subsidiary's stock.
As one might guess, this exceptional treatment is subject to detailed statutory
requirements and complicated administrative adjustments. Before turning
to a current analysis of these provisions, however, it is appropriate first to
examine their legislative history to aid in understanding congressional intent
and purpose.
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY

Corporate Liquidation: Section 332
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1935, amounts distributed in complete liquidathe
tion of a corporation were treated as being received in full payment for
s
11
fully
exchange'
the
on
loss
or
gain
realized
outstanding stock, with any
19
recognized under familiar rules. Because this applied with equal force to
20
the liquidation of a subsidiary, parent companies often had little incentive
21
to eliminate unnecessary corporations from their financial structures.
On October 24, 1929-Black Thursday as it later was to be called-an
overstimulated American economy and an erosion of confidence in business
15. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, §110(a), 49 Stat. 1020.
paid by the parent
16. A stepped-up basis is not invariably the result, for the amount
was the situation
This
assets.
own
its
in
may be less than the subsidiary's adjusted basis
F.2d 718, 51-1
187
curiam,
per
afl'd
(1950),
74
T.C.
14
Co.,
Milling
in Kimbell-Diamond
(1951).
U.S.T.C. 9201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
CODE OF 1954,
17. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §115(c), 48 Stat. 711 (now INT. REv.
9282,
§331(a)). See Gulf, Mobile & N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 788, 791, 36-1 U.S.T.C.
(1936).
574
U.S.
299
denied,
cert.
at 9829-30 (5th Cir.),
OF 1954,
18. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §111, 48 Stat. 703 (now INT. REv. CODE
be the
shall
property
of
disposition
other
or
sale
the
from
§1001(a)) provided: "The gain
113(b)
excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
the
be
shall
loss
the
and
gain,
determining
for
§1016(a)]
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
amount
excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the
realized."
1954,
19. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §112, 48 Stat. 704 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
gain
the
of
amount
entire
the
property
of
§1002) provided: "Upon the sale or exchange
be
shall
§1001(a)],
1954,
OF
CODE
REv.
INT.
[now
III
section
under
or loss, determined
recognized, except as hereinafter provided in this section."
20. E.g., Neptune Meter Co. v. Price, 98 F.2d 76, 38-2 U.S.T.C. 9384 (2d Cir. 1938);
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 259, 42-2 U.S.T.C. 9711 (Ct. CI. 1942).
21. J.C. Penney Co., 37 T.C. 1013, 1021 n.21 (1962).
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caused the -dramatic collapse of the stock market on Wall Street. In the -ensuing era of financial uncertainty and depression, many corporations were
forced into bankruptcy primarily because they had been built on unsound
23
economic foundations. 22 This was. particularly true of holding companies,
which could be used legally to avoid most forms of government and financial
regulation 24 thereby making them popular vehicles for circumventing the
antitrust laws.2 5 Moreover, because holding companies were frequently
organized by inversely pyramiding a controlling stock interest in the hands
of a few men with the thinnest possible equity, 26 actual ownership could be
divorced from control.2 7 It is not surprising, therefore, that many of these
28
topheavy giants collapsed under their own abusive weight, bringing down
in domino fashion otherwise healthy subsidiaries with them.
Consequently, many people came to believe that the "absentee owner-

ship" attributable to these fiscal oligarchies was largely responsible for the
economic depression.- The obvious cure for the depression, they reasoned,
could be achieved by promptly liquidating all such irresponsible organizations. 30 Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt pointed out to Congress the
need for- remedial legislation, stating "we should seek through taxation- the
simplification of our corporate structures through the elimination of -un31
necessary holding companies in all lines of business." '

Congress responded in 1935 by enacting section 112(b)(6), which generally
extended nonrecognition treatment to the liquidation of an eighty per cent

subsidiary by its parent corporation.32 By providing a tax-free method for
liquidating unnecessary controlled subsidiaries, Congress hoped to encourage
the simplification of complex corporate financial structures.

2

Its intentions

22 ENcYcLoPAEDIA BRITANNICA, UNITED STATES (OF AMERICA) 578, 673 (1978).
23.. A writer of the 1930's, defined a holding company as: "Any company, incorporated
or unincorporated, which is in a position to control, or materially to influence, the management of one or more other companies by virtue, in. part at least, of its ownership of
securities in the other company.-or companies." J. BONBRIGHT & G. MEANs, THE HOLDING.
ComiANY 10 (Ist ed. 1932).
24. Id. at 6-4, 35-37.
25. Id. at 32-35.
26. Id. at 4, 18, 30-32, 46.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Other abuses included the reduction of competition, perpetuation of control,
manipulation of contractual and financial activities of the subsidiaries, and almost complete
disregard of the rights and interests of the investing public. Id. at 12-49.
29. Colgan & Molloy, Tax-Free Liquidations of- Corporate Subsidiaries Under Section
112(bX6) of the Internal Revenue Code, 4 TAx L. Rnv. 305 (1949).
80. Id.
31. H.R. R-p. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in, 1939-1 (pt. 2) Cum.
BuL. 642, 644.
32. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, §110(a), 49 Stat. 1020.
33. 80 CoNo. RM 8799, 10,270 (1936). See Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367
F.2d 669, 674, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 29681, at 87,228 (8th Cir. 1966); Commissioner v. Kay Mfg.
Corp., 122 F.2d 443, 445, 41-2 U.S.T.C. 19635, at 10,490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
680 (1941); International Inv. Corp., 11 T.C. 678, 683 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 175 F.2d
772, 49-2 U.S.T.C. 19361 (3d Cir. 1949).
22.
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were noble but the statute soon proved to be poorly drafted,3 resulting in
difficulties in administration 35 that prompted the lawmakers to replace it in
the following year with a more workable statute.36 This revised section
112(b)(6) was essentially carried forward in the 1939 Code 3 T and today appears
as section 332 in the 1954 Code.
Basis: Section 334(b)
38
Like the liquidation statute it implemented, the 1935 basis provision
proved to be unsatisfactory and was only briefly used. 39 When Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1936, section 113(a)(15),40 the predecessor of section
334(b)(1), became the applicable rule for determining the basis of property
distributed to a parent corporation in complete liquidation of a subsidiary.
The new statute generally provided that the subsidiary's basis in its assets
would carry over to the parent on the transfer. This was consistent with the
idea that section 112(b)(6) was a tax-free exchange41 effectuating a change of

42

form rather than of substance.

34. Colgan &= Molloy, supra note 29, at 306. The faulty design of §112(b)(6) was due
partly to the fact that it was an apparent afterthought on the part of Congress. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his message to Congress on June 19, 1935, recommended that
such a law be enacted. See note 31 supra. Hearings held before the Senate Finance Committee
to consider this proposal disclosed that corporations were reluctant to liquidate their subsidiaries and recognize the resulting gain, as required under the existing revenue laws.
Hearings on H.R. 8974 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
170-71, 301-03 (1935). Apparently motivated by this testimony and the President's recommendations to simplify corporate structures, Senator Harrison, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, introduced on August 15, 1935, an amendment to the Revenue Act
of 1935, providing generally for the nonrecognition of gain or loss upon the receipt by
the parent corporation of liquidation proceeds from an 80%-owned subsidiary. 79 CONG.
REC. 13,239-40 (1935). See J.C. Penney Co., 37 T.C. 1013, 1021 n.21 (1962); Busterud, The
Liquidation of Subsidiaries Under Section 112(bX6), 58 YALE L.J. 1050 (1949); MacLean,
"Creeping Acquisitions," 21 TAx L. REv. 345, 348 n.6 (1966). A week later the House Conference Committee submitted Senator Harrison's amendment (with certain modifications)
for full House consideration. The Act as amended was enacted into law on August 30, 1935.
See STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, H.R. REP. No. 1885, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in, 1939-1 (pt. 2) CUM. BULL. 660, 662; Act of Aug. 30,
1935, ch. 829, §110(a), 49 Stat. 1020.
35. International Inv. Corp., 11 T.C. 678, 683 (1948), afl'd per curiam, 175 F.2d 772,
49-2 U.S.T.C. 9361 (3d Cir. 1949); 80 CONG. REC. 8799 (1936) (remarks of Senator George);
Darrell, Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 927-28
(1941).
36. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, §112(b)(6), 49 Stat. 1679.
37. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, §112(b)(6), 52 Stat. 485; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1,
§112(b)(6), 53 Stat. 38 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §332).
38. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §113(a)(6), 48 Stat. 706 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§358, 1031).
39. See 80 CONG. REC. 8799 (1936) (remarks of Senator George).
40. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, §113(a)(15), 49 Stat. 1684 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§334(b)(1)).

41.

STATEMENT OF THE

42. B. BITrKER
HOLDERS, 11-26 (3d

MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE

J. EusrIcE,
ed. 1971).
&c

FEDERAL

INCOME
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Unfortunately, these provisions soon proved to be the germ of litigation.
In the usual situation where the parent corporation claimed nonrecognition
treatment in order to shield its realized gain, the Commissioner would sometimes argue that the statute was inapplicable because its detailed provisions
were not followed precisely.4 .3 On other occasions, however, the parent would
maneuver to avoid the nonelective clutches of section 112(b)(6), often by
simply failing to comply with its express statutory requirements. Noncompliance proved advantageous, for example, whenever the statute precluded
the parent from recognizing a tax loss where its basis in the subsidiary's stock
exceeded the fair market value of the property received in liquidation.44
Moreover, in keeping with the "change of form only" notion, the carryover
basis rule completely disregarded the parent's stock basis in the subsidiary,
even though the acquisition-liquidation resulted in neither gain nor loss to
the parent. 45 Depending upon whose viewpoint was being advanced, the
argument was frequently made that the form of the transaction should not
46
prevail over its substance.
This contention was particularly appealing where one corporation purchased the stock of another solely to obtain its assets through prompt liquidation. Looking to the realities of the transaction, a parent often argued that
the general carryover basis rule created "an unjustified dichotomy between
two otherwise similar methods of acquiring the assets of another corporadon."47 If those assets were purchased directly, the parent would have a cost
basis in them.48 If, however, the target company refused to sell its assets,49
the acquiring corporation might purchase a controlling stock interest and
then obtain the desired assets through liquidation. Unfortunately, this cir43. E.g., Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 9681 (8th
Cir. 1966) (§112(b)(6) held applicable even though the final liquidating distribution was
made outside the statutory 3-year time limit, and despite the parent's failure to submit
assessment waivers or protective bonds as required in the regulations).
44. E.g., Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214, 48-1 U.S.T.C. 9237
(6th Cir. 1948) (§112(b)(6) held applicable despite the absence of a formal plan of liquidation and taxpayer's failure to comply with pertinent Treasury regulations); Commissioner
v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517, 45-2 U.S.T.C. 9403 (3d Cir. 1945) (§112(b)(6) held
inapplicable and the subsequent loss on liquidation was recognized, where parent reduced
its stock holdings below the requisite 80% level).
45. Additionally, a parent falling squarely within the inflexible framework of §§112(b)(6)
and 113(a)(15) (now §§332 and 334(b)(1)) might be quite willing to recognize a capital
gain on the distribution in order to obtain a stepped-up cost basis in the assets received
and to avoid inheriting the subsidiary's earnings and profits. The nonelective status of
§332, however, precludes this result.
46. E.g., Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F-2d 588, 38-2 U.S.T.C. 9580 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938); Helvering v. Security Sav. & Commercial Bank, 72
F.2d 874, 4 U.S.T.C. 1343 (4th Cir. 1934); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 3
U.S.T.C. 1142 (10th Cir. 1933); Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946).
supra note 42, at 11-35.
47. B. BiTrrrm. & J. Eus-ci,
48. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §113(a), 48 Stat. 706 (now INT. Rv. CODE or 1954,
§1012).
49. Factors might include an inadequate purchase price, a desire to continue existing
operations, inability to replace assets sold due to scarcity or increased costs, and the usual
reluctance of buyers to assume existing and contingent liabilities when purchasing assets.
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cuitous route often activated the nonelective provisions of sections 112(b)(6)
and 113(a)(15), resulting in a carryover of basis that precluded the indirect
purchaser from taking his real cost basis in those assets. 50 Evidently, Congress
had overlooked this type of transaction, for the legislative history of these
sections is primarily directed toward the liquidation of corporations operated
for some time as subsidiaries. 5 '
Addressing this inconsistent result, a number of pre-1954 cases looked
through the ostensible form to the realities of the underlying transaction. 2 In
the landmark case of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 53 the petitioner corporation, after one of its flour mills was destroyed by fire, purchased for cash all
of the outstanding capital stock of Whaley Mill & Elevator Company. The
petitioner's minutes clearly showed that its sole purpose in acquiring the
stock was to obtain Whaley's milling facilities by complete liquidation "as
(soon as practicable after the purchase ....
4 Three days later the company
was liquidated, and all assets were transferred to the parent corporation in
complete cancellation of Whaley's capital stock. In order to carry over Whaley's
basis in the assets, which exceeded the purchase price of its stock, the petitioner argued that sections 112(b)(6) and 113(a)(15) applied to the liquidation 55
The Tax Court, relying on the governing principle of an earlier case,5 6 held
to the contrary. The court found it "inescapable from petitioner's minutes...
that the only intention petitioner ever had was to acquire Whaley's assets."5 7

50. This carryover in basis, which represents the subsidiary's adjusted basis in its assets,
would seldom equal the parent's purchase price for the subsidiary's stock, which reflects the
fair market value of those same assets.
51. See United States v. M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 19209 (5th Cir. 1960).
52. See cases cited note 46 supra. See also Henderson, Voting Stock in a Two-Step Asset
Acquisition: The Kimbell-Diamond Reorganization, 25 TAx L. REv. 375, 381-82 (1970).
53. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718, 51-1 U.S.T.C. f9201 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
54. 14 T.C. at 76.
55. It is interesting to note that it was the Commissioner who argued for the application of the step transaction doctrine, because this effectuated a "stepped-down" basis in
the assets received. In subsequent cases, however, the Kim bell-Diamond rule frequently
worked to the advantage of the taxpayer, giving him the benefit of a higher cost basis
rather than a carryover basis under §334(b)(1). See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States, 264 F.2d 161, 59-1 U.S.T.C. 19279 (5th Cir. 1959); Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 25
T.C. 408 (1955), acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
56. 14 T.C. at 80. See Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 38-2 U.S.T.C.
%9580 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938), where the taxpayer corporation purchased the capital stock of another corporation over the course of a year in order to obtain
certain oil and gas leases through liquidation. The court combined the stock purchase
and liquidation under the step transaction doctrine and held that the two transactions
were in reality a purchase of assets. In reaching this conclusion, the court aptly observed:
"The question remains, however, whether . . . the entire transaction, whatever its form,
was essentially in intent, purpose and result, a purchase . . . of property. . . . And without regard to whether the result is imposition or relief from taxation, the courts have
recognized that where the essential nature of a transaction is the acquisition of property,
it will be viewed as a whole, and closely related steps will not be separated either at the
instance of the taxpayer or the taxing authority." Id. at 591, 38-2 U.S.T.C. 19580, at 10,718.
57. 14 T.C. at 80.
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Noting the well-settled rule that "the incidence of taxation depends upon
the substance of a transaction," 5 the court viewed the stock purchase and
liquidation as a series of closely related steps in furtherance of the single objective of purchasing assets, rather than as separate and independent events.
Accordingly, section 112(b)(6) did not apply to the transaction,, and petitioner
was forced to take the lower cost basis in the assets received on liquidation. 5
1. When Congress enacted the 1954 Code four years later, it added section 334(b)(2) as an exception to the general carryover provision in order to
incorporate "rules effectuating principles derived from Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. . . ."0 In codifying this step transaction doctrine, Congress endeavored "to inject some degree of certainty"' by providing a mechanical test
to replace a factual determination of the subjective intent of the indirect purchaser. 62 In general, section 334(b)(2) entitles the parent to a cost basis in
assets received from its liquidated subsidiary if the detailed statutory prerequisites are met. In view of the unresolved questions that abound in this
area, it is ironic that Kimbell-Diamond's subjective intent standard may sometimes be easier to prove.
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

Section 332
In general, section 332 is a nonelective" exception to the recognition provisions of section 331.64 If its statutory conditions are met, section 332 pro58. Id., citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 45-1 U.S.T.C. 19215
(1945).
59. 14 T.C. at 80.
60. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954). In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States, 264 F.2d 161, 163, 59-1 U.S.T.C. %9279, at 71,602-03 (5th Cir. 1959), the court
succinctly explained the Kimbell-Diamond rule: "[W]hen stock in a corporation is purchased
for the purpose and with the intent of acquiring its underlying assets and that purpose
continues until the assets are taken over, no independent significance taxwise attaches to
the.several steps .of a multiple step transaction. The final step is, therefore, viewed not as
independent of the stock purchase but simply as one of the steps in a unitary transaction,
the'purchase'of assets."
61. American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 207, 68-2 U.S.T.C.
9472, at 87,633 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
62. / Id. The purchaser's intent, for example, was to acquire oil producing properties in
Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 38-2 U.S.T.C. 9580 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1938); to obtain substantially similar milling equipment to replace
its flour mill destroyed by fire in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd
per curiam, 187 F.2d 718, 51-1 US.T.C. 9201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951);
to obtain equipment and oil and gas leases in Kanawha Gas & UtiL, Co. v. Commissioner,
214 F.2d 685, 54-2 U.S.T.C. 9508 (5th Cir. 1954); to acquire a large timber tract in
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 59-1 U.S.T.C. 9279 (5th Cir. 1959);
to continue the business operations of the acquired corporations in United States v.
M.OJ. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 9209 (5th Cir. 1960), followed in, Rev. Rul. 60246, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 462.
" 63. Section 332(a) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized." (Emphasis
added.) But see B. BrrrER & J. Eusrc, supra note 42,.at 11-30 rL51 for an interesting
argument that can be advanced in support of the elective status of §332.
64. INT. Rxv. CoDE oF 1954, §331 generally treats the amounts distributed in complete
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vides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a parent corporation on the
receipt65 of property66 distributed7 in complete liquidation of an eighty per
cent subsidiary within specified time limitations.68 Hence, neither the subsidiary corporation being liquidated69 nor the minority shareholders,, 0 who

also share in the distributed assets, falls within the general rule of section
332(a).
To qualify under section 332(b)(1), 71 the recipient parent corporation must

liquidation of a corporation as being made in full payment for the stock exchanged, with
gain or loss to the recipient determined under §1001 and recognized as required under
§1002, except as otherwise provided. Treas. Reg. §§331-1(a), (b). The nonrecognition
provisions of §332 constitute one such exception to this general rule.
65. Section 332 applies only in cases where the parent receives at least partial payment
for the stock that it owns in the liquidating subsidiary. Therefore, if the subsidiary is insolvent and the parent receives nothing on its liquidation, §332 is inapplicable, but §165(g)
may allow a deduction for the loss on the worthless securities. Treas. Reg. §1.332-2(b). See
Commissioner v. Spaulding Bakeries, Inc., 252 F.2d 693, 58-1 U.S.T.C. 9320 (2d Cir. 1958);
Northern Coal & Dock Co., 12 T.C. 42 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3; Iron
Fireman Mfg. Co., 5 T.C. 452 (1945), acquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 4.
66. For §332 purposes, property includes money. Rev. Rul. 69-379, 1969-2 Cum!. BULL.
48. See Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669, 675, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 19681, at
87,229 (8th Cir. 1966).
67. A mere intention to liquidate or even the dissolution of the corporation under
local law will not suffice in the absence of an actual distribution of the subsidiary's assets
among its shareholders. 1 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §9.76 (1969).
68. Complete liquidation includes "any one of a series of distributions by a corporation
in complete cancellation or redemption of all of its stock in accordance with a plan of
liquidation under which the transfer of the property under the liquidation is to be completed within a time specified in the plan ....
" STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART
OF THE HOUSE, supra note 34. The liquidation is completed whenever the liquidating corporation and the receiver or trustees in liquidation are finally divested of all property, both
tangible and intangible. Treas. Reg. §1.332-2(c). The retention of a nominal amount of
assets for the sole purpose of preserving the corporation's legal existence is permissible, since
legal dissolution of the corporation is not required. Id. Yet, if any property is retained by
the subsidiary for the purpose of continuing present business operations or engaging in a
new business, then the liquidating distribution cannot qualify as a distribution in complete
liquidation within the meaning of §332. Herbert A. Nieman & Co., 33 T.C. 451 (1959),
acquiesced in, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 6; Rev. Rul. 66-186, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 112.
69. Koppers Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 946, 950, 60-2 U.S.T.C. 9595, at 77,209 (Ct.
Cl. 1960). Section 336 determines the tax consequences to the liquidating subsidiary upon
the distribution of its assets in partial or complete liquidation. But see INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §332(c) for a special nonrecognition rule accorded the liquidating subsidiary.
70. Treas. Reg. §1.332-5. In many cases the minority shareholders will recognize gain
or loss on the liquidation under the rules of §§331(a), 1001, and 1002. This is not invariably
the result, however, for they may be entitled to nonrecognition treatment under §333 (Rev.
Rul. 56-212, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 170; see Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(8)), or to the special benefits
of §337(d). See Treas. Reg. §1.337-5. Moreover, the transaction may take the form of a
statutory merger that qualifies as a nontaxable reorganization under §§368(a)(1)(A),
354(a). In this event, neither the minority shareholders nor the parent corporation would
recognize gain or loss on the transfer. May B. Kass, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), aff'd without opinion,
491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970); INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §332(b) (last sentence); Treas. Reg. §§1.332-2(d), (e).
71. See Rev. Proc. 73-17, 1973-32 INT. REv. BULL. 12 for a checklist of information to
be included when requesting rulings under §§332 and 334(b).
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own on the date72 that the plan of liquidation is adopted 7s and at all times
during the entire liquidation period 74 at least eighty per cent of the combined
72. Timing may become a critical factor, because the requisite 80% controlling
interest must exist on the date that the plan of liquidation is adopted. Although §332(b)(2)
expressly provides that shareholder adoption of the liquidating resolution "shall be considered an adoption of a plan of liquidation" if the property transfer is completed within
the taxable year, neither the statute nor implementing regulations offer any further
guidance as to when other acceptable methods are deemed to be adopted. Presumably,
shareholder approval of the resolution authorizing the subsidiary's directors to liquidate
pursuant to applicable state law constitutes the requisite date in most cases. This
thought is reinforced by the §337 regulations, which explain that formal adoption of
the liquidation plan takes place at the shareholders' meeting, and this is ordinarily the
date on which the shareholders adopt the resolution authorizing the distribution of all
corporate assets, other than those retained to meet claims of creditors, in redemption of all
outstanding stock. Treas. Reg. §§1.337-2(b), -6(a)(1). The regulations, however, further
state that the date of the shareholders' meeting is controlling only in certain situations
(which are not relevant to §332), concluding with the qualification that "[i]n all other
cases the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be determined from all
the facts and circumstances." Treas. Reg. §1.337-2(b). In essence, the Treasury's position is
that the date of the shareholders' meeting is normally, but not necessarily, the controlling
date. Compare Rev. Rul. 57-140, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 118, with Rev. Rul. 65-235, 1965-2 Cum.
BULL. 88. This flexible approach appears warranted, albeit subjective, because the shareholders of a closely-held corporation might informally approve a plan to liquidate. Jessie
B. Mitchell, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1077 (1972) (involving §337). Additionally, applicable
state law may allow a short merger, whereby the board of directors of the parent corporation can authorize its merger with an essentially wholly-owned subsidiary without shareholder approval of either corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW ANN. §905 (McKinney 1963)
(95% ownership requirement); Dr.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §253 (1969) (90% ownership requirement); ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. §75 (1971) (90% ownership requirement).
73. The physical act of adopting a plan of complete liquidation will ordinarily present
a more troublesome question than its adoption date. This is apparent in situations where
the taxpayer seeks to comply with the nonrecognition provisions of §332 by increasing its
stock holdings to the requisite 80% level immediately before adopting a formal plan of
liquidation. On various occasions the Commissioner has taken a dim view of such lastminute purchases. Although ordinarily recognizing the shareholders' meeting as controlling
in most cases, see note 72 supra, he may assert that the acquiring parent had informally
decided to liquidate its subsidiary before purchasing the necessary additional shares. Distributors Fin. Corp., 20 T.C. 768 (1953), acquiesced in, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 4; Rev. Rul. 70106, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 70; cf. Rev. Rul. 65-235, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 88 (involving §337);
Jessie B. Mitchell, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1077 (1972) (involving §337). In other situations
the Commissioner has successfully prevented the parent from avoiding the' provisions of
§332 and recognizing a loss, by asserting that the taxpayer's intent to liquidate is controlling, rather than the existence of a formal plan. Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner,
167 F.2d 214, 48-1 U.S.T.C. 9237 (6th Cir. 1948); Service Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
75, 48-1 U.S.T.C. 9198 (8th Cir. 1948). This substance-over-form approach seems sensible,
for otherwise a taxpayer could manipulate the nonelective provisions of §332 almost at
will by calibrating his degree of compliance in adopting a formal liquidation plan with
with his desire to fall within or without the statutory framework.
74. The question may arise whether a parent can avoid the nonelective clutches of §32
by disposing of enough stock in a subsidiary to bring its holdings below the requisite 80%
mark before receiving all of the property in liquidation. Confusion arose under the 1939
Code, because §112(b)(6) not only required the parent to maintain a controlling 80% interest during the entire liquidation period, but also prohibited the parent from disposing
of any stock in the subsidiary during this time. Thus, in Commissioner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517, 45-2 U.S.T.C. 9403 (3d Cir, 1945), where the sale of stock
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voting power of all classes of the subsidiary's voting stock75 and at least eighty
per cent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock,7 6 except
for nonvoting preferred. Additionally, the liquidating distribution must totally
cancel or redeem all of the subsidiary's stock and the entire transfer must
either be completed within the taxable year 7- pursuant to the plan,7 8 or
where the distributions extend over a period of more than one taxable year,
be accomplished in accordance with a plan that provides for the transfer
of all property within three years from the close of the taxable year during
which the first liquidating distribution is made.7 9 If the transfer is not cornoccurred after the decision to liquidate the subsidiary had been reached but immediately
prior to any actual distributions, the court held §112(b)(6) inapplicable. When Congress
enacted the 1954 Code it eliminated the no-disposition rule "with the view to limiting
the elective features of the section." S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60, at 255. Accordingly,
§332(b)(1) merely provides that the requisite 80% controlling interest must exist on the
date the plan is adopted and at all times thereafter until the property is received, and
current regulations embody this congressional intent. See Treas. Reg. §§1.32-2(a), (c).
75. Generally, the security must provide for "significant participation in the management" of the corporation in order for it to be considered voting stock. Cf. Rev. Rul. 63-234,
1963-2 CuM. BULL. 148, 149.
76. The Treasury maintains that the phrase "80 percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock" requires the ownership of stock possessing at least 80%
of the total number of shares of each class of outstanding nonvoting stock. Rev. Rul. 59-259,
1959-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
77. The Treasury has ruled that this requirement relates to the taxable year in which
the transfer of property is made, rather than the year in which the plan of liquidation is
adopted. Therefore, if the subsidiary is completely liquidated within one taxable year, §332
applies despite the fact that the liquidating distribution may be delayed for several years
after adoption of the plan. Good business reasons, however, should require the delay because it subjects the plan and property distribution to careful scrutiny by the Service. Rev.
Rul. 71-326, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 177. The legislative history of §332 clearly supports the
Treasury's position. See STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, supra
note 34, at 663.
78. For this purpose, §332(b)(2) specifically provides that "the adoption by the shareholders of the resolution under which is authorized the distribution of all the assets of
such [subsidiary] corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock shall
be considered an adoption of a plan of liquidation, even though no time for the completion of the transfer of the property is specified in such resolution .... " The implementing
regulation provides: "The plan of liquidation must be adopted by each of the corporations
parties thereto; and the adoption must be shown by the acts of its duly constituted
responsible officers, and appear upon the official records of each such corporation." Treas.
Reg. §1.332-6(a). Prudence therefore dictates that the shareholders formally approve
the directors' resolution to liquidate, or if state law permits a short merger, that the
board of directors formally adopt the plan of liquidation. See notes 72-73 supra.

79.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §332(b)(3). But see Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner,

167 F.2d 214, 48-1 U.S.T.C. [9237 (6th Cir. 1948), where the taxpayer corporation asserted
that no formal liquidation plan existed, but even if one had been made, it failed to specify,
as required by statute, that the transfer of all property was to be completed within three
years from the close of the taxable year during which the first of the series of distributions
under the plan was made. The court held to the contrary. It found that the taxpayer's
board of directors had adopted unanimously a resolution that its 80% subsidiary "be immediately dissolved as provided by [North Carolina] law ....
" Applicable law continued
the corporate existence for three years, during which time the directors acting as trustees
were to wind up the business of the corporation. Because the liquidation was actually com-
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pleted 0 within this period,8 ' or if the parent does not remain a qualified
eighty per cent shareholder at all times until the property is received, then
nonrecognition treatment will be retroactively disallowed and the parent
82
must recognize gain or loss with respect to each distribution under the plan.
Because of this possibility, the Commissioner may require the taxpayer to
post bond or waive the statute of limitations on assessment and collection, or
both, whenever the transfer of all property is not in fact completed within
the taxable year.83 In this manner the assessment and collection of all income taxes attributable to the previously distributed property is assured.
The Code provides a special rule in situations where the liquidating subsidiary corporation is indebted to its parent corporation when the plan of
liquidation is adopted.4 Whenever section 332(a) applies to the liquidating
distributions, then subsection (c) extends nonrecognition treatment to the
subsidiary upon the transfer of appreciated or depreciated property in satis-

faction of its indebtedness to the -Parena.8 Section 332(c), however, has no
application to the parent corporation, which must recognize any gain or loss
when realized8s If, for example, it had purchased the subsidiary's bonds at
pleted within that time, the court found that the requirements of §112(b)(6) (now §332)
had been met, even though no precise time for liquidation had been specified.
80. See note 68 supra.
81. "[T]he statute makes completion within the statutory period mandatory .
Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214, 218, 48-1 U.S.T.C. 9237, at 350 (6th
Cir. 1948). But see Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669, 66-2 U.S.T.C.
9681 (8th Cir. 1966), where the settlement of lawsuits against the liquidating British subsidiary of an American corporation involuntarily delayed the final distribution beyond the
requisite three-year period. (In this instance, final payment was made approximately
6V years after the first distribution.) Nevertheless, the court held that the taxpayer was
entitled to the nonrecognition benefits of §112(b)(6) (now §332), stating: "The intendrnent of the statute should not be thwarted by technical niceties .... The record discloses
nothing indicative of purposeful delay in distribution . . . [because] one knows that a
claim or lawsuit cannot be settled unilaterally .... The purpose of §112(b)(6)(D) was fulfilled. The corporate structure was simplified. The statute's three-year period strikes us
as being primarily a significant indicator of the genuineness of the plan of liquidation. There
is no question as to genuineness here .... Only the barrier of the English law prevented
what is, at most, technical compliance with the statute's requirements. We are not inclined to impose a forfeiture of tax consequences because of this. If there was noncompliance here, the situation is one of excusable noncompliance and one which fits
the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia." Id. at 676, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 19681; at 87,229-30.
82. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §332(b); Treas. Reg. §1.332-4(b).
83. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, §332(b) (penultimate sentence). The implementing -regulatiohs iaKe clear that although the "recipieni corporation may be required to file a bond,"
it 'shall . .. file . . . a waiver of the statute of limitations on assessment." Treas. Reg.
§§1.332-4(a)(3), (2). A parent's failure to submit assessment waivers or protective bonds,
however, does not amount to a forfeiture of the nonrecognition provisions of §332. CherryBurrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669, 677, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 9237, at 87,231 (8th Cir.
1966). The Treasury maintains a contrary position, treating the required filing as a condition precedent to the applicability of §332. Id.; Treas. Reg. §1.332-4(b) (first sentence).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §332(c).
,84.
85. Treas.
Reg. §1.332-7. Except in this limited instance, the nonrecognition provisions of §332 have no application to the liquidating subsidiary. See note 69 supra.
86. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 461, 49-1 U.S.T.C. 19211 (5th
Cir. 1949); Treas. Reg. §1.332-7.
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a discount and received the face amount on liquidation, gain would be
recognized to the parent corporation.7 Where the payments received are less
than the parent's basis, a deduction for the worthless securities is allowed. 8s
Several collateral points also deserve mentioning. As in other areas of
income taxation, state law is not controlling in determining whether a distribution is an ordinary dividend or whether it occurs pursuant to a liquidation or reorganization.5 9 Moreover, it is not necessary for the parent corporation to continue the prior business operations of its subsidiary for the nonrecognition provisions to apply to the liquidation.9" Finally, section 332 is
inapplicable to the liquidation of a foreign subsidiary, unless the taxpayer obtains an advance ruling from the Commissioner that the proposed plan does
not have as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income
taxes. 91
Section 334(b)
Coupled with the liquidation provisions of section 332 are the rules for
determining basis under section 334(b). Section 334(b)(1) continues the carryover basis rule contained in section 113(a)(15) of the 1939 Code,9 2 by providing that the property received by a parent corporation in complete liquidation of its subsidiary under section 332 will have the same basis as it had in
the hands of the subsidiary at the time of transfer,9 3 that is, a substituted
basis.94 Moreover, the parent normally succeeds to the tax attributes of the

87. Treas. Reg. §1.332-7. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §61(a)(12); United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 U.S.T.C. 1814 (1931).
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §165(g); Treas. Reg. §1.332-2(b). In this situation there
is no distribution in complete liquidation as required by §332(b), because bondholders
have liquidation priority over stockholders. Hence, the recipient parent will be entitled
to a worthless securities deduction for the balance of the unpaid debt and for its investment loss in the subsidiary's capital stock. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 47 B.T.A. 213 (1942),
acquiesced in, 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 8. But see Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 159 F.
Supp. 366, 58-1 U.S.T.C. 9337 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (note given by wholly-owned subsidiary to
parent lacked economic reality and bad debt and worthless stock loss deductions were
denied); Woodward Iron Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 54, 45-1 U.S.T.C.
9180 (N.D.
Ala. 1945) (advances to two wholly-owned subsidiaries, unsupported by notes or other
evidences of indebtedness, were not deductible bad debts where no demand for payment
was made).
89. Frelmort Realty Corp., 29 B.T.A. 181 (1933); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §332(b); Treas.
Reg. §1.332-2(d). Moreover, in cases where there is a complete liquidation, §332 takes
precedence over the reorganization sections. Kansas Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner,
462 F.2d 805, 72-2 U.S.T.C. 9590 (10th Cir. 1972); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §332(b); Treas.
Reg. §§1.332-2(d), (e). But see American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
90. Rev. Rul. 70-357, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 79 apparently clears up the confusion created
by Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321, 46-2 U.S.T.C. 9322 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946).
91. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §367. But see Rev. Rul. 64-177, 1964-1 (pt.1) CuM. BULL. 141.
92. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
93. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(b).
94. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1016(b).
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subsidiary,95 including its earnings and profits,9 6 certain carryovers such as
net operating losses,9 7 capital losses, 98 and investment credit. 99
In 1954, as a result of the decision in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.,
Congress enacted a rather complex exception to the general carryover basis
rule. If the parent can meet the detailed requirements, section 334(b)(2) provides that the parent's basis in the distributed property is to be computed
with reference to its basis in the subsidiary's stock immediately before the
liquidation. 0 0 In other words, section 334(b)(2) generally gives the parent
a cost basis (with certain adjustments) rather than a substituted basis in the
subsidiary's assets received on liquidation. To this extent the statute reaches
the same result as Kimbell-Diamond, but it also replaces the "tenuous
standard of subjective intent"''1 1 inherent in the judicial doctrine with more
objective criteria. 0 2 In essence, the exceptional basis provision of section
334(b)(2) applies only to property received in a complete liquidation governed
by section 332.103 Once this threshold requirement is met, if the parent
corporation had previously purchased at least eighty per cent of the subsidiary's stock, other than nonvoting preferred, during a twelve-month period
and then caused the acquired corporation to be liquidated within two
years from the last purchase, section 334(b)(2) provides 04 that the basis of
all assets received by the parent is its adjusted basis in the subsidiary's stock
with respect to which the liquidating distribution is made, subject to certain adjustments. 10 5
In this manner the statute endeavors to treat the parent as a purchaser
of assets. Thus, the over-all statutory pattern quite consistently provides that
the parent does not inherit the tax attributes of its liquidating subsidiary, 0 1
yet this concept is not generally extended to require realization of gain or loss
by the liquidating subsidiary on this indirect sale of its assets to the pur07
chasing parent.
95. Id. §381(a)(1).
96. Id. §381(c)(2).
97. Id. §381(c)(1).
98. ld. §381(c)(8).
99. Id. §381(c)(23).
100. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c).
101. Lewis, Cost-of-Stock Basis for Assets Received from Acquired Corporation, 19 U.
MIrmi L. R v. 159, 171 (1964).
102. Madison Square Garden Corp., 58 T.C. 619, 626 (1972), aIJ'd in part and rev'd in
part, 500 F.2d 611, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 19618 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §34(b)(2); Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c); Yoc Heating Corp.,
61 T.C. 168 (1973). Thus, §334(b)(2) applies only to the parent corporation and not to the
minority shareholders, who also share in the liquidation. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60;
INT. R~v. CODE OF 1954, §334(b)(4); Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(8).
104. See Supreme Inv. Corp. v. United States, 468 F.2d 370, 377, 72-2 U.S.T.C. f[9689, at

85,708 (5th Cir. 1972).
105. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c).
106. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §381(a); Supreme Inv. Corp. v. United States, 468 F.2d
570, 377, 72-2 U.S.T.C. 9689, at 85,708 (5th Cir. 1972).
107. See Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, 324 F.2d 837, 64-1 U.S.T.C. 9101 (9th
Cir. 1963); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §36. But see Blueberry Land Co., 42 T.C. 1157 (1964),
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With respect to the eighty per cent ownership requirement, section
334(b)(2)(B) substantially duplicates the wording used in section 332(b)(1),
and it is entirely consistent with congressional intent and rules of statutory
construction to interpret both phrases harmoniously. 08 Additionally, section 334(b)(2) specifies that the requisite control must be purchased during
a twelve-month period. 1°9 In general, Congress intended "to limit the definition of the term 'purchase' to cases where the acquisition of the stock was
made in a taxable transaction.""

0

A "purchase" is thus defined in the statute'

to include any acquisition of stock, except when it has been acquired in a
transaction where the parent's basis carried over from the prior owner'
or by inheritance from a decedent,' 13 in a section 351 exchange,"1 or from a
related person where the attribution rules of section 318(a) would be applicable.115 In essence, the first three exceptions were designed to prevent a
parent from obtaining a possible stepped-up basis in assets distributed with
respect to stock acquired in a nontaxable transaction," 6 while the latter provision was enacted to prevent manipulation among related persons."-

afj'd, 361 F.2d 93, 66-1 U.S.T.C. 9420 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court held that the
"parent" corporation served no real or useful economic purpose and that the acquisitionliquidation transaction was a sham, with gain recognized to the transferor corporations.
108. Cf. Madison Square Garden Corp., 58 T.C. 619 (1972), afJ'd in part and rev'd in
part, 500 F.2d 611, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. Normally, the twelve-month period runs from the date on which the parent makes
its first purchase in furtherance of obtaining a controlling interest. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§334(b)(2)(B)(i). In situations where the controlling stock of the desired corporation [S-2] is
acquired from an existing subsidiary [S-1], the twelve-month period commences from the
date on which the parent acquires at least 50% of S-l's stock, if this represents the earlier
date. Id. §334(b)(2)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(7)(ii); S. REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), reprinted in, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 1059, 1101.
110. S.REP. No. 1622, supra note 60, at 258.
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §334(b)(3). For a more exhaustive analysis of the purchase
area, see O'Hara, Liquidation of Subsidiaries-Basis-Sec.334(bX2), BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO
No. 16-4th at A-6 to -10 (1973). See also Bijou Park Properties, Inc., 47 T.C. 207 (1966),
acquiesced in, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 1.
112. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§362, 1015.
113. Id. §1014.
114. Id. §351. See Rev. Rul. 57-296, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 234 (a §351 transfer to a controlled corporation does not constitute a purchase for purposes of §334(b)(2)(B) due to the
application of §334(b)(3)(B)).
115. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §318(a). Section 334(b)(3) was amended in 1966 (Act of
Nov. 1966, Pub. L. 89-809, Title II, §202(a), 80 Stat. 1576) "to cure the timing problem
created by §334(b)(3)(C) where a chain of subsidiaries was acquired and liquidated into the
parent in the wrong order .... ." B. BrrrKrR & J. EusTIcE, supra note 42, at 11-37. The
amendment expanded the definition of "purchase" for purposes of §334(b)(2) to include
"an acquisition of [S-2] stock from a corporation [S-2] when ownership of such [S-I] stock
would be attributed under section 318(a) to the person [P] acquiring such [S-1] stock, if
the stock of such [S-1]corporation . . . was acquired by purchase (within the meaning of
the preceding sentence)." INT. RE.v. CODE OF 1954, §334(b)(3) (last sentence). The committee
report's explanation of the change appears in S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 109.
116. Madison Square Garden, 58 T.C. 619, 625 n.6 (1972), afJ'd in part and rev'd in
part, 500 F.2d 611, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 109.
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Once control has been achieved by purchase during a twelve-mont period,.
a plan of liquidation must be adoptedi" s within two years from -the date. on
which the controlling interest was acquired."19 It is not necessary for the
liquidating distribution to occur during this two-year period -if good business
reasons cause the delay."20 Section 334(b)(2),- however, applies only to the
stock owned by the parent corporation immediately before the liquidation,12
and only property received with respect to such stock is given special treat2
ment under the statute.
Finally, Congress has authorized the Commissioner to make proper adjustment in the cost basis that the distributed property assumes in the
hands of the distributee corporation."= These computations can become
quite complex,"14 and the area abounds with unanswered questions. 125 As a
118. The date of adoption of the liquidation plan is determined under §332(b)(2).
Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(2). See notes 72-73 supra.
119. Where a controlling interest is obtained in a single purchase, the two-year period
will begin on the day following such purchase. Whenever control is acquired through a
series of purchases, the two-year period commences on the day following the earliest date
(which is the end of a twelve-month period or less) on which the requisite 80% stock
interest was acquired. For example, if 20% of the subsidiary's stock is purchased on each.
of the following dates, April 1, 1973, June 30, 1973, September 30, 1973, December 31, 1973,
and June 1, 1974, the two-year period shall-begin on January 1, 1974, because this is the
earliest date ending a twelve-month period or less (here, nine months) on which the requisite
80% stock interest was acquired. If, however, 20% of the subsidiary's stock is purchased on
each of the following dates, November 1, 1972, June 30, 1973,. September 30, 1973, December
31, 1973, and June 1, 1974, then the two-year period shall begin on June 2, 1974, because
this is the earliest date ending a twelve-month - period or less (here, eleven months) on
which the requisite 80% stock interest was acquired. See Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(2).
120. The liquidation of a subsidiary into its parent where for good business reasons
the single liquidating distribution was delayed until three years after the plan was adopted
qualifies under §332, and the basis of the transferred assets is determined under §334(b)(2).
Rev. Rul. 71-326, 1971-2 Cum. BULL.-177..
121. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(1)- Sales during. the liquidation period are permitted so
long as the parent maintains an 80% interest in the subsidiary's stock. See note 74 supra.
122. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(i). For this purpose, the basis of the stock used to
determine the basis of the assets is the total basis of all stock held by the parent whether
or not such stock was acquired by purchase and whether or not it was acquired during
the twelve-month acquisition period specified in §334(b)(2)(A). Id.
123. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §334(b)(2) (last sentence). The term "distributee" is
specially defined in §334(b)(4) to mean only the corporation that meets the specified 80%
stock ownership requirements specified in §332(b).
124. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c); B.. BrIrrnr & J. EusrcI, supra note 42, at 11-38
to -45; Bonovitz; Current Liquidation Problems Under Section 334(bX2) and Section 337
Distributions and Reseroes, N.Y.U. 30m INsr. ON FED. TAX. 1095, 1135-42 (1972); O'Hara,

supra note 111, at A-10 to -30.

125. Most conspicuous are the problems arising from a delayed liquidation, reorganization overlap, and numerous valuation problems including cash or its equivalent, Burnet V.
Logan "open" liquidations, and goodwill. See B. BrrrKER & J. Eus-rc., supra note 42, at
11-38 to -45; O'Hara, supra note 111, at A-10 to -30. It is interesting to note one commentator's general observations: "In spite of the fact that Section 334(b)(2) has been in the law
since 1954 and certainly is a provision that has been .used many times, there is almost a
complete absence of litigation on it, and very little in the way of published articles. It
would appear that controversies which have arisen have been settled at the Service level
and probably without much uniformity ....
Certainly the section and its regulations need
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general rule, however, it may be said that the final adjusted basis of the
2 6
assets received equals the parent's total basis in the subsidiary's stock,'
1 27
increased by the amount of any unsecured liabilities assumed by the parent
and by its undistributed share of the subsidiary's earnings and profits since
acquisition. 28 This in turn is reduced by pre-liquidation distributions to the
parent,29 its share of the subsidiary's deficit in earnings and profits since
acquisition, 30 and by any cash or its equivalent received in the liquidation."1
The parent's basis as adjusted is then allocated among all the various
tangible and intangible assets received, except for cash and its equivalent."'3
Normally, this allocation of basis is made in proportion to the net fair market
values1 33 of the assets on the date distributed in liquidation to the parent.
The intended thrust of these provisions, therefore, is to assign a basis to
the distributed assets as if they had been purchased directly from the acquired
corporation, rather than through the circuitous route of first purchasing
stock and then immediately liquidating the subsidiary corporation. 3 4 This is
entirely consistent with the underlying philosophy of Kimbel-Diamond, which
forms the cornerstone for the statutory exception. But does this mean that
section 334(b) (2) has completely preempted application of the judicial
doctrine?

clarification." O'Malley, The Pitfalls of a Section 334(bX2) Liquidation and How To Avoid
Them, 24 J. TAXATION 138, 142 (1966).
126. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(4). The adjusted basis of the subsidiary's stock in the
hands of the parent includes all stock held by the parent whether or not acquired by
purchase or during the twelve-month acquisition period specified in §334(b)(2)(A). Id.
§1.334-1(c)(1).
127. Id. §l.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(l).
128. Id. §1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2).
129. Id. §1.334-1(c)(4)(i). This reduction shall not be made to the extent that the
distributions reduced the parent's basis under §301(c)(2), or to the extent that the distributions were made out of earnings and profits accumulated since the stock was purchased. Id.
§ 1.334-1(c)(4)(iv).
130. Id. §l.334-1(c)(4)(v)(b)(2).
131. Id. §1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(b)(1).
132. Id. §1.334-1(c)(4)(viii). Although neither the Code nor regulations define "cash
or itsequivalent," the Service in Rev. Ril. 66-290, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 112, stated that the
phrase includes cash, currency, bank deposits, time deposits, share accounts in savings and
loan associations, checks, drafts, money orders, and "any other item of similar nature."
This does not, however, include accounts receivable, inventories, marketable securities, and
other similar current assets, even if highly liquid in nature. Id. In essence, cash or its
equivalent encompasses those items that have no value other than face value and hence "could
not logically be given a basis." Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 770, 773,
68-2 U.S.T.C. 9509, at 87,754 (D. Idaho 1968), aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 426, 70-2 U.S.T.C.
9595 (9th Cir. 1970).
133. Treas. Reg. §1.334-1(c)(4)(viii). "Net fair market value" is defined as fair market
value less any specific mortgage or pledge to which the asset is subject. Once the allocation
of basis has been made, the amount of the lien is then added to the basis of the
property against which the lien exists. Id.
134. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 770, 771, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9509,
at 87,753 (D. Idaho 1968), ajf'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 426, 70-2 U.S.T.C. ff9595 (9th Cir.
1970).
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CURRENT PROBLEMS

Current Vitality of Kimbell-Diamond
When Congress added section 334(b)(2) to the 1954 Code, it sought to
incorporate "rules effectuating principles derived from Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. " 1 35 Thus, it was generally assumed that the Kimbell-Diamond

rule,13 6 which looks to the purchaser's subjective intent, was completely
codified by the enactment of section 334(b)(2). This view is reflected in the
Treasury's contention that section 334(b)(2) is the exclusive exception to the
general carryover basis rule of section 334(b) (1).137 But a parent corporation
failing to meet the rigid statutory requirements of section 334(b)(2) will
sometimes assert that Kimbell-Diamond is not "dead." According to this
argument, the parent's intent to purchase assets entitles it to a cost basis in
the distributed assets because of the application of the judicial doctrine. 3
Litigation arising from section 334(b)(2) is surprisingly scarce, and the
reported decisions that discuss this problem are indeed few in number. 39
Yet the increasing frequency with which this issue is being raised, undoubted40
ly at the conference level, prompted the Service to list it as a "prime issue"'
in 1973-one that the Commissioner will litigate, rather than settle or concede.
In one of the few reported cases that have met this question directly, the
4
Court of Claims in American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States' '
held that "[i]n the absence of some specific direction that Kimbell-Diamond
is no longer viable, we find that it has not been pre-empted by section
334(b)(2) ."142 In American Potash, the taxpayer corporation (Potash) ac135. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60.
136. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
137. See, e.g., American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 68-2
U.S.T.C. 19472 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Yoc Heating Corp., 61 T.C. 168 (1973). But see Rev. Rul. 74-35,
1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 2, at 6.
138. E.g., American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 68-2 U.S.T.C.
19472 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
139. See Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 209, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 19615 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 94 S. Ct. 1469 (1974); Griswold v. Commissioner,
400 F.2d 427, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 19559 (5th Cir. 1968); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 288
F. Supp. 770, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9509 (D. Idaho 1968), aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 426, 70-2
U.S.T.C. 9595 (9th Cir. 1970); American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d
194, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The current vitality of the Kimbell-Diamond rule,
however, is a favorite topic among tax commentators. See, e.g., authorities cited in American
Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 208, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472, at 87,633 (Ct.
Cl. 1968); O'Hara, supra note 111, at A-27; Note, Federal Income Tax-KimbeU-Diamond, Section 334(bX2) and the "Indirect Purchaser," 23 Sw. L. J. 393 (1969); Note, Taxation-Basis
for Assets in Liquidations-Viability of Kimbell-Diamond Doctrine in Light of Section
33.t(bX2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 920 (1969).
140. 9 CCH 1974 STAND. Fa. TAx REP. 6632, at 71,416; 7 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. 18213, at 74,397. This issue was released by the Service under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1970).
141. 399 F.2d 194, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
142. Id. at 208-09, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472, at 87,633.
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quired all of the stock of Western Electrochemical Company (Wecco) in
block purchases of forty-eight and fifty-two per cent over a period of fourteen
months. Potash exchanged its own voting stock plus an insignificant amount
of cash in each of the two transactions. At no time during any twelvemonth period did Potash attain the eighty per cent ownership level required
by section 334(b) (2), and upon achieving complete control, it operated Wecco
14 3
as a subsidiary for seven months.

The only issue for the Court of Claims to determine was the proper
basis for the depreciable assets distributed to Potash. In rejecting the Government's contention that a carryover basis was required under the tax-free reorganization provisions of section 368(a)(1)(C),144 the court found that "the

basic transaction was a stock-for-stock exchange
than a stock-for-asset exchange

(B reorganization)

rather

(C reorganization)."' 14 5 Because Potash had

not obtained control of Wecco within a twelve-month period, 146 the majority held that a B reorganization14 had not in fact occurred. 14 8 Moreover, because the stock-for-stock exchange failed to qualify as a valid B reorganization, the court refused to apply the step transaction doctrine, as
the Government urged, 14 9 to look through the form of the transaction (two
exchanges followed by a liquidation and distribution of Wecco's assets) and
transform its individual steps into a qualifying stock-for-asset exchange under
50
section 368(a)(1) (C).1

In the alternative, the Government argued that the liquidation of Vecco
was governed by section 332, and therefore, a carryover basis under section
334(b)(1) was required."' Because Potash had not purchased the requisite
eighty per cent controlling interest within a twelve-month period, it conceded the inapplicability of section 334(b) (2). Potash asserted, however, that
the basic doctrine of Kimbell-Diamond should apply because its sole purpose
throughout the entire fourteen-month period was to acquire the assets of
152
Wecco.
The court accepted the taxpayer's contention, holding that the judicial
doctrine had not been preempted by the enactment of section 334(b)(2). In
143. Id. at 197, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 19472, at 87,624.
INT. REV. CDE OF 1954; §§368(a)(1)(G), 361(a).
145. 399 F.2d at 200,- 68-2 US.T.C. 9472, at 87,626.
146. See Treas. Reg. §1.368-2(c), which echoes S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60, at 273.
Although the twelve-month period appears to be merely a guideline in determining whether
a B reorganization has occurred, the Potash court chose to apply this language quite literally. It should not be confused with the twelve-month purchase period contained in §334(b)(2),
which is mandatory. See text following note 151 infra.
147. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §368(a)(1)(B).
148. 399 F.2d at 201, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 19472, at 87,627.
149. Because the Government was arguing for the applicability of the step transaction
doctrine to the'asserted B reorganization, at first blush it would appear inconsistent that
the Government alternatively asserted that Kimbell-Diamond was no longer viable. It
should be remembered, however, that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is merely a factual
application of the broader step transaction doctrine to the indirect purchase situation.
150. 399 F.2d at 201-05, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 19472, at 87,627-31.
151. Id. at 206, 68-2 U.S.T.C. %9472, at 87,631.

,144.

152.

Id. at 206-07, 68-2 U.S.T.C. %9472, at 87,632.
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reviewing the relevant legislative history, the court observed that neither
the House nor the Senate committee reports expressly stated that section
334(b)(2) was the exclusive exception to the general carryover rule, or that
Kimbell-Diamondwas preempted by its enactment. On the other hand, neither
report stated that the doctrine was still. viable. 153 Turning to the legislative
history of other Code sections within these same 1954 committee reports, the
court emphasized that whenever Congress intended to modify or change an
existing judicial doctrine by enacting a particular statute, it generally made
a statement to that effect in the report. Finding no comparable language in
the legislative history of section 334(b)(2), -the court refused to infer that
5
Moreover, the maCongress had intended to preempt Kim bell-Diamond.1
jority found "without question" that the doctrine remained viable for individual taxpayers, who purchased stock in order to obtain corporate assets
through a prompt liquidation, 55 because section 334(b),(2) applies only to
corporate taxpayers. 5 8 Therefore, the court .concluded that Congress had
not "intended to differentiate between corporate and individual taxpayers and
permit the use of the judicial Kimbell-Diamond doctrine by an individual
who has acquired stock during a period in excess of twelve months, and to
deny its application to a corporate taxpayer under the same circumstances."'' 57
Although this case has evoked considerable -response from tax commentators,158 the. decision has yet to be adopted by another court. 15 9 It is nevertheless submitted that theKinmbell-Diamond doctrine maintains current vitality
in the revenue laws, as correctly decided by the Potash court.
In this context "[i]t is firmly established that in applying the revenue
laws, we must look to the substance of a transaction rather' than to its form unless from an examination of the statute and its purpose form was intended to
'be determinative."' 60 Finding no clear-cut directive from the congressional
153. See H.R. REP. No. 1"37, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954); S. REP., No. 1622, supra
,note 60.

.

154. 399 F.2d-at 209, 68-2 U.S.T.C. .190~2, at 87,633-34,
'estao-'0f
155. Id. at 208, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472,' at '87,6S3." S&e

J-ames F. Suter, 29 T.C.

244 (1957), acquiesced in, 1958-g Cum. BULL. 8; H.B. Snively,. 19 T.C. 850 (1953), aff'd, 219
F.2d 266, 55-1 U.S.T.C. 9221 (Sih Cir. 1955); ac4'iesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 8; Ruth M.
Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950), acquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 1; Rev. Rul. 69-242, 1969-1
Cuzm. BuLL. 200.
156. See note 103 supra.
157. 399 F.2d at 208, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 9472, at 87,633.
158. See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 111, at A.27; Note, 23 Sw. L.J., supra note 139; Note,
14 WAYNE L. REv., supra note 139.
159. See, e.g., Yoc Heating Corp., 61 T.C. No. 168 ,(1973), where the Tax Court was
urged to consider the current vitality of the Kimbell-Diamond-doctrine but declined to
do so. Relying on its decision in Boise; Cascade -Corp. y;. United; States, 429 F.2d 426, 70-2
U.S.T.C. 19595 (9th Cir. 1970), aftg per curiam 288 F. Supp. 770, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 19509 (D,.Idaho
1968), .the. Ninth Circuit: h~s recently reaffirmed its position that "the. Kimbell-Diamond
philosophy is no longer. controlling . ..... " Pacific ,Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 483, F-2d
U.S.
", 94 S. Ct.
209, 213, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 9615, at 81,984 (9th Cir. 197M),,cert. denied,
1469 (1974). The Fifth Circuit seemingly:.holdsto the contrary. Griswold y. Commissioner,
....
.
.40a F.2d 427, 68-g U.S.T.C. 9559 (5th -Cir. 1968).,
160. Herman Glazer, 44 T.C. 541, 545-46 (1965) (citing numerous, cases)...
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language, particularly when compared to the definitive statements contained
in other sections of the same report, the Potash court reasoned that Congress
could have used language to preempt Kim bell-Diamond, yet apparently chose
not to do so. Instead, the House committee report merely stated: "In this
respect the principle of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. .

.

. is effectuated."

16

,

The Senate's version was almost identical, incorporating "rules effectuating
principles derived from Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co..... 162 The key word
in both reports is "effectuate," which means "to bring about; cause to happen;
effect; accomplish.' 16 3 Clearly, none of these synonyms even implies preemption. It therefore seems unwarranted to believe that Congress intended preemption when it could have so easily stated, as it did in other sections. Addressing this semantic problem the Court of Claims aptly observed:
Obviously Congress intended to inject some degree of certainty into an
area of the tax law previously occupied by problems of proving that a
taxpayer had the requisite intent. It is not a necessary conclusion therefrom that Congress intended, by establishing an objective route for
obtaining a cost basis without the need for proving an intent to acquire
assets, to prohibit both the government and taxpayers from further
resort to proof of a subjective intent to obtain the assets (without
6 4
complying with the precise objective tests of section 334(b)(2)).1
Thus, the step transaction doctrine as developed in Kimbell-Diamond
was a factual application of the broader tax principle that substance should
prevail over form. By substituting a mechanical test for the court's subjective
intent standard, certainly Congress did not intend to preempt this judicial
doctrine in cases where the parent had the requisite intent to purchase assets,
but failed to comply with the detailed statutory requirements.165 Instead,
Congress provided objective criteria to aid rather than restrict the courts in
determining the proper basis under section 334(b). Admittedly, the KimbellDiamond rule involves problems of proof, "but the end result of consistent
treatment of transactions for what they are more than compensates for the
inconvenience of administering the doctrine."'' 61
The "Backed Into" Purchase
In the recent case of Madison Square Garden Corp., 67 the question arose

concerning the appropriate tax basis for assets distributed to the taxpayer
corporation on the liquidation of its subsidiary, the old Madison Square
161. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 153.
162. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 60.
163. WEBSTER'S NEW WoRLD DIG'IONARY 239 (1965).
164. 399 F.2d at 207-08, 68-2 U.S.T.C. %9472, at 87,633.
165. The Treasury's position is to the contrary, stating that "the formal steps themselves are significant under the 1954 Code and the element of purpose or intent is immaterial." Rev. Rul. 60-262, 1960-2 CUM. BuLL. 114, 115.
166. Note, 15 WAYNE L. REV., supra note 139, at 927.
167. 58 T.C. 619 (1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 500 F.2d 611, 74-2 U.S.T.C.
19618 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Garden Corporation (Garden). During the period February 19, 1959, through
January 31, 1960, the taxpayer purchased 288,351 shares of Garden's only
authorized class of capital stock. When the initial purchase was made, Garden
had 563,500 shares outstanding, but during the next eleven and one-half
months, Garden purchased and retired 203,800 shares of its own stock. As a
result of these transactions, on February 1, 1960, the taxpayer owned approximately 80.16 per cent of Garden's total shares outstanding as of that
date. During the month of March the taxpayer purchased an additional 200
shares, boosting its ownership to 80.22 per cent of Garden's 359,700 outstanding shares. 68
On April 20, 1960, Garden was formally merged into the taxpayer corporation. Pursuant to the merger-liquidation agreement, the owners of the other
71,149 shares of Garden stock received 160,085 shares of the taxpayer's $0.60
cumulative preferred stock in exchange for their Garden stock. Accordingly,
the taxpayer received 100 per cent of Garden's assets on liquidation.16 9
The Government conceded the applicability of section 332 to the mergerliquidation, which was treated as a liquidation for tax purposes. 70 Disagreement arose, however, in determining the proper basis for the distributed
assets. The Government asserted that the taxpayer was limited to a substituted
basis, because it had not acquired by purchase eighty per cent of the stock
outstanding on the date when the first qualifying purchase was made. The
taxpayer, on the other hand, argued that it had fully complied with the requirements of section 334(b)(2), therefore entitling it to a stepped-up basis
for all assets received on liquidation.'' 1 The Tax Court granted the taxpayer
a step-up in basis but limited this to 80.22 per cent of the assets received, because it controlled only that percentage of Garden at the time of the liquida72
tion.
Cross appeals were taken to the Second Circuity s which affirmed the Tax
4
Court's holding that section 334(b) (2) governed the determination of basis."
168.
169.
170.
171.

58 T.C. at 620-21.
Id. at 621, 627.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 625-26.

172. Id. at 627.
173. Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 611, 74-2 U.S.T.C.
9618 (2d Cir. 1974).
174. Id. In accepting the taxpayer's contention, the Tax Court observed that §334(b)(2)

applied only to a liquidation that first met the requirements of §332(b). 58 T.C. at 626.
Because it was merely a basis provision "having no significance independent of the operating
liquidation provision. . . . Ei]t was not necessary for the . . . basis section to identify
when the requisite stock ownership was to be tested. Section 332(b) already stipulated that
the appropriate time to measure was 'the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation.' "

Taxpayer's Reply Brief at 5, Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 611,
74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618 (2d Cir. 1974). Noting that "section 334(b) does not expressly state
when the number of shares on which the 80 percent acquired by purchase is to be
determined," the court found that it would be incongruous, as the Commissioner urged,

to measure the 80% purchase requirement by the number of shares outstanding on the
date when the first qualifying purchase was made for purpose of §334(b)(2), but to measure
the ownership requirement of §332 at the time the liquidation plan was adopted. According.
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The appellate court found that the Commissioner's "rather mechanical interpretation of section 334(b)(2) without benefit of any direct authority" construed the word "purchase" too narrowly, 1'5 and held that the requisite controlling interest could be achieved through purchase and redemption. Thus,
even though the taxpayer in fact had purchased only a 51 per cent interest,
measured by the number of shares outstanding on the date when the first
qualifying purchase was made, this majority interest ripened into a controlling
80.16 per cent interest due to Garden's redemption of 36 per cent of its stock
17
during the acquisition period.

Turning to the question of the proper basis for the assets distributed, the
Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's holding that the taxpayer's step-up
in basis was limited to only 80.22 per cent of the assets received in liquidation.
The appellate court found that "since . . . on the date of the merger-liquida-

tion the taxpayer was obligated to the minority shareholders for 160,085
shares of the taxpayer's preferred stock, and that . . . [the taxpayer] thus ac-

quired 100% of the Old Garden assets, the stepped-up basis should apply to
that 100% rather than to the lesser percentage owned prior to the actual distribution. ' ' 177 Because this obligation to buy out the minority shareholders
was "an integral part of the entire transaction,' '178 the taxpayer necessarily
owned all of Garden's capital stock immediately prior to the liquidating
distribution. How else could it have received all of Garden's assets on liquidation?
To buttress its decision, the Second Circuit found that the rationale of
Revenue Ruling 59-412179 applied to treat the minority interest as a liability
assumed by the taxpayer, with a corresponding step-up in basis. In that ruling,
one corporation purchased 99 per cent of the shares of another. Immediately
thereafter, the acquired corporation was merged into the parent in a liquidation to which section 332 applied. Under the merger agreement, all of the
subsidiary's assets were distributed to the parent subject to the interests of
the minority shareholders, who were entitled to receive cash for their shares.
Because the parent corporation purchased these minority shares after the
ly, the court held that the same point in time measures the requisite controlling interest

for both statutes, namely, the date on which the plan of liquidation was adopted. 58 T.C.
at 626.
175 500 F.2d at 612, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618, at 85,005. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §334(b)(3).
176. In rejecting the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer could not "back
into" the requisite 80% ownership interest by having the subsidiary redeem and retire some
of its own shares, the court weakened the credibility of an earlier ruling. In Rev. Rul. 70106, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 70, the Service ruled: "The liquidation of a subsidiary fails to
meet the 80 percent control requirement under section 332(b)(1) of the Code where a
corporate shareholder owning 75 percent of the subsidiary's stock redeems the minority
shareholders' 25 percent interest before adopting a liquidation plan." Hence, §331 governs
the liquidation with respect to all shareholders. Id. at 71. Although the Commissioner conceded the applicability of §332 to the case sub judice, he nevertheless attempted to distinguish the similar facts in the ruling on the basis of distinguishable factual situations.
See 58 T.C. at 624 n.4.
177. 500 F.2d at 613-14, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618, at 85,006.
178. 500 F.2d at 613, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618, at 85,006.
179.

1959-2 GuM. BULL. 108.
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liquidating distribution, only the cost of the parent's 99 per cent stock interest,
with respect to which the distribution was made, was included in determining
the basis of the assets received under section 334(b)(2). The amounts paid
to the minority shareholders pursuant to the merger agreement were treated,
in effect, as if the parent had assumed and discharged an obligation of the subsidiary to its minority shareholders. Accordingly, the ruling held that the
parent corporation was "entitled to have a basis attach to the assets to the
extent the liability was assumed and paid. ' 18 In Madison Square Garden, the
minority shareholders'held 19.78 per cent rather than 1 per cent of the outstanding stock, and they were entitled to receive preferred stock instead of
cash pursuant to the merger plan. Thus, the appellate court found that the
ruling "controls just this case." '1's
The Second Circuit's decision appropriately clarified confusion created
by the Tax Court with respect to determining the proper basis of the -assets
received on liquidation of Garden.182 But by virtue of the fact that the Service
raised this issue in direct opposition to Revenue Ruling 59-412, the same
problem in the context of a slightly different factual situation may surface
again.
CONCLUSION

Enacted during the Great Depression to simplify corporate structures, the
precursor of section 332 granted nonrecognition treatment to the parent
corporation on the liquidation of an eighty per cent owned subsidiary. The
concomitant basis provision, which is currently found in section 334(b)(1),
provided that the subsidiary's basis in its assets carried over to the parent
on the liquidation. The inherent inequity of a carryover basis in situations
where a corporation purchased the stock of another solely to obtain its assets
through immediate liquidation, however, prompted the courts to apply the
step transaction doctrine to these related events. Thus, the parent obtained
a cost rather than a substituted basis in the distributed assets, which conformed
to the realities and substance of the underlying transaction.
The problems in applying the subjective intent standard of. the judicial
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, however, soon convinced Congress of the need for
a statute that contained more objective criteria. The lawmakers responded in
1954 with section 334(b) (2), which generally incorporates the principles of
Kimbell-Diamond and gives the parent a cost basis in the subsidiary's assets
received on liquidation. Unfortunately, section 334(b)(2) has -created problems where none previously existed. One such controversy involves the cur180. Id. at 110.
181. 500 F.2d at 614, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618, at 85,007.
182. In two subsequent cases involving the same type of transaction, the Tax Court
recognized the rationale of Rev. Rul. S9-412, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 108. Therefore, to avoid a
charge of inconsistency, it distinguished its opinion in Madison Square Garden on procedural
grounds. 500 F.2d at 615, 74-2 U.S.T.C. 9618, at 85,008. See May B. Kass, 60 T.C. 218,
223-25 (1973), aff'd without opinion, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); Yoc Heating Corp.,
Q1 T.C. 168, 179 n.17 (1978).
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